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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930006-CA 
V. : 
DANNY L. HERRING, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction by a jury 
of tampering with a witness, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the 
evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. In 
reviewing a jury verdict, this Court views the evidence and all 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
verdict and will only interfere when the evidence is so lacking 
and insubstantial that a reasonable jury could not possibly have 
reached the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Burk, 
839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 
(Utah 1993); State v. Salas. 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App. 
1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Danny Herring was charged by information with 
witness tampering, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1990) (R. 1). A jury found him guilty as 
charged, and the court ordered a presentence report prepared (R. 
66, 47). The court sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison 
for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years, to run 
consecutively with the sentence he was then serving on other 
charges (R. 73-74). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict. State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 
App. 1993); State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah App. 1992), 
cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
Troy Lott, a long-time friend of defendant's, was the 
victim and principle witness in a previous trial in which 
defendant was tried on assault-related charges (R. 5, 10; Trial 
Transcript [hereinafter nTr.n] 6-7). At the preliminary hearing 
in the assault matter, Lott testified that defendant had kicked 
him in the face (Tr. 6-7, 9, 10, 12, 14-15, 35-36). The 
afternoon before the assault trial, defendant telephoned Lott 
solely to discuss the next day's trial (Tr. 5-6, 21-22, 27). 
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With no preliminary conversation, defendant asked if Lott was 
going to testify at the trial the following day (Tr. 6, 13). 
Lott replied that he was going to appear and testify (Tr. 13-14). 
When defendant asked what Lott was going to say, Lott responded 
that he "was going to tell the truth, the same thing [he] said in 
the preliminary [hearing.]" (Tr. 7, 14). Defendant claimed that 
he could not remember kicking Lott and asked whether it might 
have happened differently (Tr. 7, 14, 16, 37) . Lott responded 
that he not only remembered defendant kicking him, but that he 
would say so at trial (Tr. 7, 14-16). Defendant remarked that it 
would help him out if Lott did not say that at trial (Tr. 7, 15) . 
He then stated that Lott would be better off if he did not 
testify or defendant would bring up a murder Lott had allegedly 
confessed to several months earlier (Tr. 8, 15, 17).x Both men 
then hung up (Tr. 8, 16-17, 31). Lott immediately reported the 
phone call to the police (Tr. 21-22). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented at trial, together with all 
reasonable inferences, was sufficient to establish thfct 
defendant, believing that an official proceeding was pending, 
1
 Although defendant remembered the details of the phone 
conversation differently, he admitting bringing up the subject of 
the murder (Tr. 28-29) . He claimed that when he reminded Lott 
about an earlier conversation in which Lott allegedly said that he 
did not remember defendant kicking him in the head, Lott responded 
that he did not remember saying that (Tr. 28) . Lott then 
commented, "I think you know that you kicked me in the head twice 
and I think you ought to think about that[,]" to which defendant 
responded, "Well, I think you ought to think about the gun spree 
you told me about" (Tr. 28-29). 
3 
attempted to induce or otherwise cause a witness to withhold 
testimony or information. Accordingly, the jury had sufficient 
evidence on which to base its conviction of defendant for 
tampering with a witness. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF TAMPERING WITH A 
WITNESS 
Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to 
prove that defendant, believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation was pending or was about to be instituted, 
attempted to induce or otherwise cause Lott to withhold any 
testimony, information, or item. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
508(1) (b) (1990).2 Relying on the dissenting opinion in State 
v. Burk. 839 P.2d 880, 888-89 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. 853 
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993), defendant contends that the language used 
by defendant amounted to a mere expression of his belief that his 
own interests would not be served by Lott's proposed testimony, 
2
 Section 76-8-508 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, 
believing that an official proceeding or investigation is 
pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to induce 
or otherwise cause a person to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, 
document, item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to 
provide evidence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or 
investigation to which he has been summoned. 
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and that defendant's language, which was devoid of threats, 
promises, or extended argument, did not amount to inducement to 
change or withhold testimony. Br. of App. at 11-16. 
This Court reviews a claim of insufficient evidence 
under a well-settled standard: 
[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences 
which might be drawn therefrom must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, 
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. 
Burk, 839 P.2d at 884 (quoting State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 
1387 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 
1147 (Utah 1989))). 
Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence establishing his belief that an official proceeding or 
investigation was pending. He challenges only the evidence 
establishing his attempt to induce or otherwise cause Lott to 
withhold any testimony, information, or item. Lott related his 
phone conversation with defendant as follows: 
Q [DEFENSE COUNSEL]. . . . But as best you can 
remember the exact words, what did [defendant] say when 
he brought the subject up? 
A [LOTT]. The subject of? 
Q. Of testifying. 
A. He asked me if I was going to testify. I told 
him yes, I was. 
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[He a]sked me what I was going to say. I said I 
was going to tell the truth, the same thing I said in 
the pretrial. 
He told me he couldn't remember kicking me in the 
face. Asked me if I might have done it when I jumped 
in the back of the truck. I told him, "No, Danny[,] 
you kicked me in the face, and I remember and I'm going 
to tell it the same as I did in the pretrial.If 
Q. And what was the next thing that was said? 
A. Well, he said it would really help him out a 
lot if I didn't testify to that. 
Q. Were those his words to the best of your 
memory? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what did you say? 
A. I didn't say nothing. Then he just -- that's 
when he brought up the card game and Pleasant Grove. 
(Tr. 13-16). Lott detailed the remark concerning Pleasant Grove 
at another point in the examination: 
A. [Defendant] brought up a time of we was having 
a party at a friend's house in Pleasant Grove, and I 
guess I'd told him about a shooting spree or something. 
He brought that up and said if I was to testify 
tomorrow, I'd be better off if I didn't testify 
tomorrow or he would bring that up. 
(Tr. 8).3 
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 The "shooting spree" included an alleged murder. The 
testimony indicated that one night several months before the 
disputed phone conversation with Lott, defendant and Lott were 
doing a lot of drinking at a party in Pleasant Grove when Lott had 
told defendant about a shooting spree Lott had been involved in 
(Tr. 8, 17, 29) . Lott claimed that several months earlier, he and 
a couple of his friends were drinking and driving around a rural 
area shooting "whatever was moving" (Tr. 30). They were 
interrupted by a man who demanded to know why they were shooting 
his coyote (Tr. 30-31). Because Lott and his friends didn't want 
to get in trouble, they allegedly shot the man, put him in the back 
6 
Defendant breaks the conversation into five individual 
pieces, characterizing defendant's questions largely as harmless 
inquiries or appropriate interrogation to be made of witnesses 
following any preliminary hearing. He contends that the final 
statement threatening to incriminate Lott in a murder cannot 
support the conviction when "viewed in the light of [the 
parties'] relationship and the Defendant's perception of [Lott's] 
rudeness[.],f Br. at 15. However, this Court reviews the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Burk, 
839 P.2d at 884. By rendering the guilty verdict, the jury 
rejected defendant's perception of the conversation. Moreover, 
the questions in this case were posed not by an attorney but by 
the accused on his own initiative immediately before trial. The 
evidence, examined in the proper light, is sufficient to support 
defendant's conviction. 
The testimony indicated that defendant called the 
State's key witness the afternoon before trial for the sole 
purpose of discussing the testimony. Defendant elicited the fact 
that Lott intended to appear at trial and that his testimony 
would parrot his incriminating testimony at the preliminary 
hearing. Defendant then suggested another scenario for Lott's 
injury, which Lott refused to accept. Immediately thereafter, 
defendant stated that Lott's testimony would be detrimental not 
only to defendant, but to Lott as well, explaining that if Lott 
of their truck, tied an anchor to him, and threw him into the lake 
(Tr. 30-31). 
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testified at the trial, defendant would implicate Lott in a 
murder. This express type of cause-and-effect statement 
constitutes the tangible indicia of inducement required by the 
dissent in Burk, upon which defendant relies, 839 P.2d at 889. 
It may reasonably be viewed as a threat and was, in fact, 
reported to the police by Lott as a threat accompanied by a 
request "to testify to something other than what he had testified 
in the preliminary hearing." (Tr. 22). Defendant believed that 
Lott may well have been involved in a murder (Tr. 29, 31-32, 41), 
and, although defendant knew that he had already reported the 
murder story to the authorities, his threat falsely suggested to 
Lott that he had not yet said anything to anyone (Tr. 31, 39-41). 
From the testimony before it, the jury may reasonably have 
determined that defendant made the statement to Lott, not as a 
reflexive retort to perceived rudeness, but on the chance that 
the murder story was true and that Lott would be intimidated to 
change his testimony to avoid having his participation in the 
murder made public. 
Moreover, Lott testified that he had been intimidated 
by defendant's suggestion that if Lott incriminated defendant, 
defendant would retaliate in kind, despite the fact that Lott 
ultimately appeared at trial and testified against defendant (Tr. 
9, 18-19). Because Utah's witness tampering statute does not 
require that the witness be affected by the attempted inducement, 
the affect on the witness is not necessarily dispositive of an 
accused's culpability. See State v. Remoel, 785 P.2d 1134, 1137 
• t 
(Wash. 1990) (involving a statute similar to Utah's). However, 
the affect may prove relevant. See State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 
422, 424 (Utah App. 1989) (conviction supported, in part, by 
witness' withholding of a report from a legal proceeding because 
comments from defendant made the witness worry that production of 
the report would cause trouble for defendant), cert, denied, 783 
P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). Here, the jury could reasonably have found 
that the threat of being implicated in a murder is likely to 
result in some degree of intimidation, and that Lott's 
intimidation, although not sufficient to change his testimony, 
was at least a foreseeable, if not an intentional, result of 
defendant's threat. 
Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support 
defendant's conviction for tampering with a witness. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and 
sentence. j 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /£) day of October, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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